NOTES
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX: PRE-1936 RESERVED
POWER TO AFFECT THE TIME OR
MANNER OF ENJOYMENT*
RECENT CASE of Lober v. United States' appears finally to have
resolved the much debated question of whether a power reserved to
the settlor of a pre-1936 trust to affect merely the time or manner of
enjoyment of the trust property is a taxable power under § 8I i(d) of
the Internal Revenue Code.2 The settlor, prior to 1936, had created
an irrevocable trust for the benefit of each of his three children, pursuant to the terms of which, he, as trustee, was to pay over or accumulate the income, in his discretion, until the beneficiaries reached
twenty-one years of age, after which time he was required to pay over
all accumulated ihcome.3 When the beneficiaries reached twenty-five
years of age, they were to receive the principal, although the decedent
reserved to himself power to pay over all or a part of the principal,
in his discretion, at any time before then. Although the indentures
made no provision for the contingency of death of the beneficiaries
prior to termination of the trusts, the Court assumed that, in such
event, the beneficial interests thereunder would vest in their respective
estates under New York law.
At the death of the settlor prior to termination of the trusts, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue included the value of the trust
property in his gross estate, which determination was upheld by the
Court of Claims. 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 5 and held,
through Mr. Justice Black (Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice
Jackson dissenting without opinion) that the decedent had retained
such control over the trusts as to bring them within his gross estate
under § 811(d) (2) for the purposes of the federal estate tax.

THE

*Lober v. United States, 74 Sup. Ct. 98 (1953).
'74 Sup. Ct. 98 (1953).
249 STAT. 1744 (936), 26 U.S.C. § 8ix (x946).
See note 8 infra.

'It would appear that when the beneficiary reached twenty-one years of age, the
trustee was also obliged to pay him all current income, although the Supreme Court's
statement of the case does not make this explicit.
1o8 F. Supp. 731 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
345 U.S. 969 (1953).

NOTES
In 1935, the Supreme Court in White v. Poor6 created some doubt,
inter alia, as to whether a power reserved to a settlor to terminate a
trust was a power taxable to his estate upon death. The decedent had
created a trust in 1919 with powers of termination reserved to the three
trustees. Decedent was one of the three original trustees, but later
resigned. Subsequently, the successor-trustee to the decedent also resigned, whereupon the decedent was reappointed trustee by the other
two trustees, in which capacity she served until her death. The Court
held that the trust property was not includible in the decedent's gross
estate under § 302(d) of the Revenue Act of 1926, because the power

to terminate was not reserved to the decedent by the trust instrument,
but rather was conferred on the decedent solely by the other trustees
under the provisions of the trust. The Court expressly declined to
decide whether a reserved power to terminate would be taxable.7 As
an aftermath of this decision, Congress, in 1936, amended what is now
§ 811 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code,8 making taxable to the settlor's
estate, upon his death, a power to "terminate," "in whatever capacity
exercisable," and "without regard to when or from what source the
decedent acquired such power."' Since this 1936 amendment was ex296

U.S. 98 (-935).

I1d.at xoi.
' Supra note 2i formerly, § 3o2(d) of the Revenue Act of

§

1gz6,

as amended by

805 of the Revenue Act of 1936.
' Provisions here relevant are:
"§ 81x.
Gross estate ...
"(d) Revocable transfers
"(i) Transfers after June 22, 1936. To the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except
in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment
thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change through the
exercise of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent
alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other person (without
regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such power),
to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is relinquished in contemplation of decedent's death;
"(2) Transfers on or prior to June 22, 1936. To the extent of
any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at
the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power,
either by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any other person,
to alter, amend, or revoke, or where the decedent relinquished any such
power in contemplation of his death, except in case of a bona fide sale
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. Except in the case of transfers made after June 22, 1936, no interest of
the decedent of which he has made a transfer shall be included in the
gross estate under paragraph (x) unless it is includible under this paragraph. ...."
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pressly applicable only to transfers made after June 22, 1936, it would
appear that it was intended to be purely prospective in application. The
question soon arose, however, as to whether this 1936 amendment
should be applied to transfers made on or prior to June 22, 1936, upon
the theory that it was merely declaratory of the pre-existing law. The
Treasury has taken the position that the phrase, "in whatever capacity
exercisable," is declaratory of the pre-existing law,"' but that the phrase,
"without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired
such power," is not. 1 Finally, the Treasury has taken the position that
the addition of the word "terminate" is declaratory of the law as it
existed prior to 1936."2 This was the view of the House Ways and
Means Committee,', and it4 also derives at least limited support from
Commissioner v. Holmes.1
Although the Holmes opinion supported the view that pre-1936
powers to terminate were taxable, it created some confusion as to the
precise scope of that amendment. In 1935 the decedent had conveyed
property to himself in trust for each of his three sons, reserving to himself the power to terminate the trusts and to pay over principal and
accumulated income to the beneficiaries at any time. If, prior to the
termination of the trust, a beneficiary should die without issue, his share
was to go pro rata to the other sons or their surviving issue, per stirpes;
if either other son should die without issue, the survivor or his issue
was to take the whole; if all the sons should die without issue, the trust
property was to go to decedent's wife, if living, if not, to her heirs at
law. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge the Supreme Court held
that the reservation of this power to terminate was sufficient to warrant
10

U.S. Treas. Reg. ios, § 8.zo(a) (94s5).

In White v. Poor, supra note 6, the

Court had found it unnecessary to consider this point, and in Commissioner v. Holmes,
3z6 U.S. 480 (1946), notes x4 and 15 infra and accompanying text, it again left the

question open.

The Treasury position has, however, been supported by decisions in

the lower federal courts. See Welch v. Terhune, x26 F.zd 695 (Ost Cir. 1942), cerl.
denied, 317 U.S. 644 (x942) 5 Union Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 138 F.2d x5z ( 3 d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 764 (943) ; Commissioner v. Newbold's Estate, x58
F.2d 694 (7d Cir. 1946) Jurd v. Commissioner, 16o F.zd 61o (xst Cir. 1947)S
Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.zd 74 (2d Cir. 1947) Du Charme's Estate v. Commissioner,
164 F.zd 959 (6th Cir. 1947); Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, x65 F.zd 142
(ist Cir. 1947).
"U.S. Treas. Reg. 1os, § 81.20(a) (1945).
12 Ibid.
18 C... Since in substance a power to terminate is the equivalent of a power to revoke, this question should
and it is believed that it
7 4th Cong., zd Sess. 1o
14 326 U.S. 480, 487

be set at rest. Express provision to that effect has been made
is declaratory of existing law. . .. "1 H.R. REP. No. 2818,
(1936).
et seq. (1945).

NOTES

inclusion of the trust property in decedent's gross estate under
§ 811(d)(2). The Court said:
It seems obvious that one who has the power to terminate
contingencies upon which the right of enjoyment is staked, so as
to make certain that a beneficiary will have it who may never come
into it if the power is not exercised, has power which affects not
only the time of enjoyment but also the person or persons ho
may enjoy the donation. More therefore is involved than mere
acceleration of the time of enjoyment. The very right of enjoyment is affected, the difference dependent upon the grantor's
power being between present substantial benefit and the mere
prospect or possibility, even the probability, that one may have
it at some uncertain future time or perhaps not at all. A donor
who keeps so strong a hold over the actual and immediate enjoyment of what he puts beyond his own power to retake has not
divested himself of that degree of control which § 811(d) (2) requires in order to avoid the tax. 5
By emphasizing the fact that the power to terminate in this case
could have been exercised so as to determine who should enjoy the
property, Mr. Justice Rutledge inferentially left open the question
whether a power to terminate which could affect only the time or manner of enjoyment is taxable under § 8i(d)(2). This question was
squarely presented in Hays' Estate v. Commissioner.6 The decedent
had conveyed property to herself in trust, reserving the power to accumulate income and to terminate the trusts at her discretion and pay
over the principal and accumulated income. Unlike the Holmes case,
however, in the event of the death of a beneficiary prior to termination,
the beneficial interest was to vest in the heirs of that beneficiary, so
that, regardless of when the trusts should be terminated, the property
would pass to the beneficiaries or their estates, respectively. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reversing the decision of the Tax
Court,' 7 held that the power to reserve by decedent was not taxable,

inasmuch as the exercise of the power could not have created or terminated any right of enjoyment of trust property or changed the persons
who should enjoy it.
Since life itself is uncertain and every power affecting the time of
enjoyment may affect as well the persons who enjoy, it would seem
that a gossamer distinction was spun by the court in the Hays case in
an effort to give effect to the statement of Mr. Justice Rutledge that
'sId. at 487.
6 181 F.2d 169 ( 5 th Cir. 1950).
17
7z T.C. 2o
(949)-
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"More therefore is involved than mere acceleration of the time of
enjoyment." In the Lober case the Court, choosing to ignore rather
than to interpret this statement, repudiated the Hays decision and
"followed" the Holmes decision in taxing to the estate of the deceased
settlor a power essentially identical with that reserved in the Hays
case. Although the Lober case is somewhat inconsistent with the
language of Mr. Justice Rutledge's opinion in the Holmes case, it seems
to be a sound interpretation of the phrase, "possession or enjoyment."'
An interesting facet which might have been here considered, but,
rather surprisingly, was not raised in the Lober case, was the fact-that
did not appear in the record-that one of the beneficiaries had reached
the age of twenty-one before decedent's death." Arguably, the Court
might have distinguished the trust for his benefit from the other two
trusts and held it not taxable to the decedent's estate upon the ground
that, since this beneficiary had a present right to the income from the
trust, the power to terminate in this situation was not a power to affect
the enjoyment of the trust property.20 Since the Court did not mention
that fact, however, it must be assumed that the power to terminate is
taxable even where the beneficiary has the present right to income as
well as a vested remainder in the principal.
A final question remains as to the possible or probable effect of the
Lober decision on the gift tax. In Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner,
'8 It is interesting to contrast the present construction of the Supreme Court of
"possession and enjoyment" with the strained construction of some of the earlier cases.
In May v. Heiner, zSs U.S. 238 (1930), this phrase was interpreted as meaning "title."
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278
Cf. Shukart v. Allen, 273 U.s. 545 (1927)
U.S. 339 (x9z9) i Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231 (x93x). In Helvering v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935), the dissent by Mr. Justice Stone heralded
construction, and the abandonment was finally effected
the abandonment of this "title'
in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. xo6 (1940). The Lober case reaffirms the latter
view of the Court, which now seems to be well established, that present economic
benefit is a more appropriate standard than the vesting of title.
"9Letter of December 8, 1953, from Mr. David Stock, counsel for petitioner.
"0Where the entire beneficial interest is vested in one beneficiary, it is held in England and in a few American jurisdictions that a beneficiary, suijuris, may terminate the
trust. Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, 49 Eng. Rep. 28z (1841). The majority view
in the United States is contrary, holding that the beneficiary in whom the entire beneficial interest is vested may not enforce a termination. E.g., Claflin v. Claflin, 149
Mass. 19, 2o N.E. 454, 3 L.R.A. 370, 14 Am. St. Rep. 393 (1889). Although the
beneficiary may not terminate, he may, however, transfer his interest in income and
See
principal. E.g., De Ladson v. Crawford, 93 Conn. 4oz, xo6 Atl. 326 (1919).
generally, 3 ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 337.3 (.st ed. 1939).
If it is assumed that the eldest beneficiary in the Lober case had a present right
to income, supra note 3, and could have alienated his right to principal and income,
it would seem that the decedent had retained no power to affect the enjoyment of the
trust property.

NOTES
the Supreme Court held that the reservation of a power to alter beneficiaries of a trust renders the transfer incomplete for purposes of the
gift tax. 21 Mr. Justice Stone indicated in the majority opinion that
the decision was influenced, in part at least, by the fact that this sort
of transfer is also incomplete for purposes of the estate tax. 22 The
Treasury Regulations state that "[a] gift shall not be considered incomplete, however, merely because the donor reserves the power to
change the manner or time of enjoyment thereof. '
It seems reasonable to assume that this position of the Treasury was predicated on the
nebulous statement of Mr. Justice Rutledge in the Holmes case, 24 that
a transfer with such a power reserved was complete for purposes of the
estate tax. In view of the decision in the Lober case that a power to
accelerate the time or manner of enjoyment is taxable under the estate
tax, it would seem that the Treasury, in the interest of logical consistency, should reverse its stand as to the taxability of that type of
power under the gift tax.
21 308 U.S. 39 (x939).

S. PERRY KEZIAH
Cf. Burnet v. Guggenheim, z88 U.S. 28o (1933) , where

the Court had held earlier that the reservation of a power to revoke prevented a gift
from being complete for purposes of the gift tax.
22Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, .5 (1939). But in Smith v.
Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (x943), decided after the Sanford case, the Court held that
a transfer retaining a reversionary interest was complete and taxable for purposes of
the gift tax even though it had, been held incomplete for purposes of the estate tax in
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. io6 (i94o).
The distinction between the Sanford
and Shaughnessy cases seems to be that, if the completion of the transfer is within the
grantor's control, the transfer will not be taxable as a gift if it is incomplete for estate
tax purposes. If, however, the completion of the transfer is not within the grantor's
control, such as a reversionary interest, it may be taxable as a gift regardless of its
treatment for estate tax purposes. In a Lober type case, since the power to terminate
is within the grantor's control, it would seem that this type transfer should escape
taxation as a gift under the holding of the Sanford case.
22
U.S. Treas. Reg. xo8, § 86.3 (2943).
24 See note 15 supra.

